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COMMENT
INDIAN COUNTRY AFTER ANCSA: DIVESTING TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY BY INTERPRETATION IN ALASKA V. NATIVE
VILLAGE OF VENETIE TRIBAL GOVERNMENT
INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Native tribe of Venetie Indians has inhabited an area in
north-central Alaska' since before the United States Supreme Court was
even a sparkle in our forefathers' eyes. Yet the recent Supreme Court
decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,2 ar-
guably stripped the Venetie Indians of the inherent sovereignty and tribal
identity they have held since time immemorial. Ignoring widely accepted
canons of statutory construction intended to help Native American peo-
ple maintain their history and existence,- the Court took a significant step
toward assimilating all Native Americans into our national melting pot
and effectively terminating the only living history that remains in our
country today.
This Comment contends that the Venetie Court's interpretation of 18
U.S.C. § 1151(b)4 was erroneous and unjust. Through its finding that the
Venetie tribe did not inhabit Indian country because it was not a depend-
ent Indian community," the Court perpetuated the federal government's
tradition of systematically chipping away at the Indians' inherent sover-
eignty.6 This decision potentially denies not only the Venetie tribe, but
1. Nearly all inhabitants of the Native village of Venetie descend from the Neets'aii
Gwich'in, a group of Alaska Natives living near the East Fork of the Ciandalar River since before
recorded history. See Alaska ex ret. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't,
118 S. CL 948 (1998).
2. 118S.CL 948,955-56(1998).
3. See, e.g., Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942) (stating that courts should
read all federal action as protecting Indian rights and in a manner favorable to Indians); Alaska
Pacific Fisheries Co. v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918) (stating that statutes affecting Indian
rights "are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians').
Among these canons is the rule that Congress's intent to abrogate Indian rights must be indicated by
a "clear and plain" statement. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 224, (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982) (quoting United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 353
(1941)).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1994) provides that a dependent Indian community constitutes In-
dian country. Although this is a criminal statute, the definition provided applies to both criminal and
civil jurisdiction. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1291.
5. Venetie, 118 S. Ct. at 955-56.
6. Those powers lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not delegated powers granted by
express acts of Congress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been
extinguished. COHEN, supra note 3, at 232. Prior to European settlement of North America, the
Indians governed themselves free of outside control. Id. As colonization progressed, the United
States recognized the Indian tribes as sovereigns and negotiated agreements to occupy the land. d
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Native Americans nationwide of the rights and sovereign powers they
have held for hundreds of years. This decision arguably ignores the intent
of Congress' in creating the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA) 9 and is unjust in its effect.
Part I details the life of the term "Indian country" from its birth in
the mid-eighteenth century to its debatable death'° in Alaska on February
25, 1998. Part H then describes the specific events leading up to the Su-
preme Court's decision in Venetie. This historical path will provide an
understanding of the unique relational status between Native Alaska
tribes and the federal government over the past two hundred years. Part
III explores these relationships further, focusing on the methods by
which the Venetie Indian's tribal sovereignty and identity have been
stripped away. In Part III, the Court's disregard of widely accepted can-
ons of statutory construction is discussed, along with some of the future
implications of the Venetie decision. Finally, Part III describes the di-
chotomy created by the Court's interpretation of section 1151, wherein
the Indians' ability to maintain their sovereignty is dependent upon the
government maintaining a high level of superintendence. This intriguing
contradiction is discussed, as it continues a tradition of governmental
inconsistency throughout history with respect to Indian tribes.
This sovereignty has eroded over time as the government has limited Indian rights and powers. See,
e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1994) (prohibiting the distribution of tribal property without the consent of the
United States); 25 U.S.C. §§ 564, 691 (1994) (terminating the federal-tribal relationship with some
tribes and subjecting others to varying degrees of state authority); General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 331-334, 339, 341,342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1994) (providing for allotments to individual Indians
thereby diminishing tribal control over Indian land); The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1994) (extending federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country); IMdian Civil Rights
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1994) (subjecting tribal authority to administrative and limited judi-
cial review). While this erosion of tribal sovereignty has continued, some statutes restricting tribal
authority and sovereignty have been repealed. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 1304-1310, 1313-1320, 1327-
1330, 1332-1340.
7. While the Venetie decision only directly affects the Venetie Tribe, it potentially may have
a secondary effect on the entire Native American community. Cf. infra note 189 (providing a histori-
cal examination of the federal government's treatment of Native American tribes).
8. The legislative history of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act states:
Under the committee bill all reservations in Alaska are revoked, unless the village corpo-
rations located within the reservation elect to take fee title to the reservation. If Natives
do elect to take title to the reservation, they will not participate in the land selection pro-
cedures of the bill, nor share in the monetary settlement.
117 CONG. REC. 46,967 (1971). This statement indicates Congress's intent that reservation status be
retained by tribes choosing this option, as did the Venetie tribe. By retaining such status, the land
remains "Indian country." Id.
9. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1994).
10. While the effect of this decision on native sovereignty resounds nationwide, the purported
"death" of Indian country refers those areas within Alaska. The decision acknowledges only one
reservation in the state which still falls under the Indian country category. Venede, 118 S. Ct. at 955-56.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Origin of "Indian Country"
The term "Indian country," first officially employed in King
George's Royal Proclamation of 1763," established a boundary line sepa-
rating the lands of the Indians from those of the colonists." After the
Revolutionary War, Congress initially used the term in passing the In-
dian Intercourse Act of 1796.'3 This law contained the first statutory defi-
nition of Indian Country, tracing a line of boundaries throughout the
continental United States. The Indian Intercourse Act of 1834 further
defined "Indian country" as "all that part of the United States west of the
Mississippi."'4 In 1872 Congress specifically extended the definition to
encompass all of the mainland, islands and waters of Alaska following a
district court's finding that the term "Indian country" did not encompass
Alaska.'3 Soon after, the portion of the 1834 Act defining Indian country
was repealed,'" leaving the determination of what comprised Indian
country to the courts." Almost a century later, Congress expressly rede-
fined "Indian country" through its enactment of section 1151 as:
I1. See COHEN, supra note 3, at 57 n.60 (describing the Royal Proclamation of Oct. 7, 1763,
of King George); see also State ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Gov't, No. F87-0051 CV, 1995 WL 462232, at *2 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 1995).
12. Venetie, 1995 WL 462232, at *2. The British temporarily drew a line along the Appala-
chian mountain range, proclaiming "[elverything to the west of the mountains and east of the Missis-
sippi [to be] Indian Country." Id. At the time, the land west of the Mississippi was claimed by
France or Spain. Id. The British attempted to establish a detailed boundary line which continued to
move westward as the Indians were compelled to sacrifice more land through purchases and treaties. Id.
13. The Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, I Stat. 469, was the "third in the series of trade and
intercourse Acts" and the first to include a detailed definition of Indian country. COHEN, supra note
3,at 112.
14. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 1,4 Stat. 729,729(1834).
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 227, 17 Stat. 510, 530 (1873). In United States v. Seveloff, 27 F.
Cas. 1021 (D. Or. 1872), the court held that Indian country was only that portion of the United States
or its territories which had been declared to be such by an act of Congress and land was not Indian
country just because it was inhabited or owned by Indians. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. at 1022. The Indian
Intercourse Act of 1834, along with the subsequent revision in 1868, was originally developed as a
provision for liquor control Id. at 1024.
16. Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 17,4 Stat. 729, 731 (repealed, in part, 1859) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 229 (1994)). In 1851, the federal government discontinued "removing"
tribes westward and began to locate Indians on tribal reservations within organized territories and
states, allotting reservation land to individual tribe members. COHEN, supra note 3, at 31. In 1874,
after these actions had all but rendered the 1834 definition of "Indian country" obsolete, the compil-
ers of the Revised Statutes omitted the definition altogether, effectively repealing it. Id. Despite the
obsolescence of the 1834 statute's definition of Indian country, an entire chapter of the new federal
laws was titled "Government of Indian Country." Id. "Without a statutory definition, the determina-
tion of what comprised Indian country was necessarily left to the courts." Id.
17. See United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 536-39 (1938); United States v. Pelican,
232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 37 (1913); Donnelly v. United
States, 228 U.S. 243, 268-69 (1913); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 561 (1883); Bates v. Clark,
95 U.S. 204, 206-08(1877). Drawing on the definition from the Indian Intercourse Act of 1834, the
Rates Court concluded that Indian lands were Indian country as long as the Indians had title to it, but
when they parted with title, it ceased to be Indian country. Bates, 95 U.S. at 208-09. This definition
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(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the juris-
diction of the United States Government,... (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether within
the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof,... and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extin-
guished.'8
Four United States Supreme Court cases played a primary role in
establishing the basis of the section 1151 definition of Indian country."
1. Donnelly v. United State?
In Donnelly v. United States, a non-Indian convicted of murdering
an Indian within the limits of the Hoopa Valley Indian reservation in
California appealed his conviction' The Donnelly Court addressed the
issue of whether the killing of an Indian by a non-Indian, when commit-
ted on an Indian reservation, fell under the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.2 The defendant alleged the federal court, in hearing the case, im-
properly infringed on the state's jurisdiction. Knowing that federal courts
have jurisdiction over Indian country, the defendant contended that the
term "Indian country" was confined to those lands the Indians retain
through their original right of possession, and therefore did not apply to
those set apart as Indian reservations out of the public domain.D The
Court concluded that "nothing can more appropriately be deemed 'Indian
country' ... than a tract of land that... is lawfully set apart as an Indian
reservation." Section 1151 (a) codifies Donnelly, providing that all land
within the limits of an Indian reservation is Indian country."
2. United States v. Sandoval' and United States v. McGowan"
Subsection (b) of section 1151, codifies the "dependent Indian
communities" test as first established in United States v. Sandoval.' In
Sandoval, the Court held the federal government has the power to enact
was expanded to include reservation lands to which Indian title had not been extinguished in Ex
parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 561. In Donnelly, the Court specified that land must be "set apart" by
the government for Indians in oner to be Indian couatry. Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 269.
18. 18U.S.C.§ 1151 (1994).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 note (Historical and Revision Notes--1948 Act) (explaining that sub-
section (a) regarding reservation lands is a codification of Donnelly, subsection (b) is a codification
of the "dependent Indian community" concept as developed in McGowan and Sandoval, and subsec-
tion (c) is the codification of the holding of Pelican regarding allotments).
20. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
21. Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 252.
22. Id. at 255.
23. Id. at 268.
24. Id. at 269.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
26. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
27. 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
28. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 45-46.
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laws for the benefit and protection of all dependent Indian communities
within the United States." At issue in Sandoval was whether Congress
held jurisdiction to protect the Pueblo Indians by prohibiting the intro-
duction of liquor into Pueblo lands. The Court concluded that such pro-
tection is extended by the United States "over all dependent Indian
communities within its borders."'
In United States v. McGowan, the Court relied on Sandoval to sup-
port its holding that a dependent Indian community is Indian country and
that Indian country exists wherever two factors are met: Indian country is
land that has been (1) "set apart for the use of the Indians as such"" and
remains (2) "under the superintendence of the [federal g]ovemment.""
Again at issue was Congress's power to protect the Indians from the in-
troduction of liquor on the Indian lands. The Court recognized that the
Reno Indian Colony was composed of several hundred Indians residing
on a tract of land owned by the United States, created for the purpose of
providing land for Indians scattered throughout Nevada. 3 Applying San-
doval, the Court found the Reno Colony had been validly set apart for the
use of the Indians and was under the superintendence of the federal gov-
ernment; therefore, the government had authority to enact regulations
and protective laws respecting such territory'
3. United States v. Pelican"
The third classification of Indian country is described in section
1151 (c) as all Indian allotments.' those Indian titles which have not been
extinguished. In United States v. Pelican, the defendants were charged
with a crime occurring upon an Indian allotment.' The defendants ob-
29. Id.
30. Id. at 46.
31. Id. at 539 (emphasis omitted). The intended meaning of this phrase is that the land be set
apart to be utilized by the Indians for Indian purposes. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie
Tribal Government, 118 S. Ct. 948,954-55 (1998).
32. McGowan, 302 U.S. at 539 (quoting United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442, 449 (1914))
(emphasis omitted).
33. Id. at 537.
34. Id. at 539.
35. 232 U.S. 442 (1914).
36. See Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, 27 Stat. 62 (creating the allotment at issue in Pelican).
This idea of "allotting" land debuted in 1887 when Congress passed the General Allotment Act.
General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
331-358 (1994)) (providing each Indian with a parcel of land in an attempt to break up tribes and
assimilate the Indians into white society by forcing them to acquire private land). The act was a
catastrophe from the perspective of both the Indian and the white man. STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE
RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS 5 (2d ed.
1992). The Indians did not want to own land individually because they preferred to own land as a
tribal unit. Id. The white man thought the Indians would emulate the non-Indians who lived among
them thereby becoming mor productive ranchers and farmers. Id. Instead the Indians fell deeper
into poverty because they were unable to maintain their previous manner of subsistence, Id.
37. The term "Indian allotment" refers to "land owned by individual Indians and either held in
trust by the United States or subject to statutory restriction on alienation." COHEN, supra note 3, at
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jected to federal jurisdiction arguing that the crime was not committed
within Indian country." Since the specific allotted lands in this case were
to be held in trust by the United States for twenty-five years from the
date of allotment for the sole use and benefit of the allottee," the Court
concluded that the lands continued to be under the jurisdiction and con-
trol of Congress. ' Such allotted lands, therefore, remain Indian country
until the allotment expires.
The concept of Indian country as the dependent Indian community
has continued to develop in the courts' focusing on the question of
whether land has been validly set apart for Indians, under government
superintendence.' Still, today it is these two characteristics which must
exist in order for a court to recognize a dependent Indian community as
Indian country.'
B. Post ANCSA Indian Country
Prior to 1971, the Venetie Indian Tribe clearly subsisted subject to
active superintendence by the government to such a degree as to amount
to a dependent Indian community for the purposes of section 1151(b)."
However, with the enactment of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act (ANCSA)' in 1971, Alaska Natives obtained ownership of approxi-
mately forty-four million acres of public land through corporations es-
tablished by the Act. In exchange, the government extinguished all Na-
tive land claims." As part of the ANCSA reorganization, Congress also
revoked all but one reservation in Alaska and included a special provi-
40. "Most allotments were originally carved out of tribal lands held in common." Ild. Since 1875,
however, a number of statutes have allowed Indians to obtain allotments out of the public domain.
Id. The General Allotment Act provided that title to land allotted to Indians would be held in trust by
the United States for twenty-five years. See supra text accompanying note 36. The 1906 amend-
ments to the Act authorized the President to extend the trust period on any allotment indefinitely.
Act of June 21, 1906, ch. 3504,34 Stat. 325,326 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 391 (1994)).
38. Pelican, 232 U.S. at 444.
39. Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, § 4, 27 StaL 62,63 (noting the provisions of the Dawes Act,
ch. 119,24 Stat. 388 (1887)).
40. Pelican, 232 U.S. at 447.
41. See United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837,839-43 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023-24 (10th Cir. 1971).
42. State ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, No. F87-
0051 CV, 1995 WL 462232, at *6 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 1995).
43. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potowatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 511
(1991) (concluding that the question of whether land constitutes Indian country turns on whether the
area was validly set apart for the use of the Indians, under the superintendence of the government).
44. Veneie, 1995WL462232, at*15.
45. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1629e (1994). ANCSA "was designed to open Alaska quickly to oil
drilling and to provide a final determination of Indian land claims in the state, transferring millions
of acres of land to native corporations." Max Mimer, Note, Construction Work: The Canons of
Indian Law, 107 YALE LJ. 863 n.4 (1997).
46. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1611, 1613. ANCSA created a complex corporate scheme for Native
land administration and development in Alaska. It provided for the creation of thirteen Native corpo-
rations and conveyed 44 million acres of land. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1607, 1611, 1613.
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sion applicable to the Natives whose reservations were revoked. This
provision permitted members or stockholders of village corporations who
had previously inhabited a reservation to vote that their corporation take
fee title to the former reservation lands.'
ANCSA, therefore, clearly and explicitly extinguished aboriginal
land title in Alaska,' yet left in its wake a question as to the remaining
existence of "Indian country" in the state. As a result of ANCSA, the
status of the dependent Indian community became ambiguous and its
survival questionable.
II. ALASKA V. NATIVE VILLAGE OF VENETIE TRIBAL GOVERNMENTo
A. Facts and Procedural History
Virtually all members of the Native Village of Venetie descended
from the Neets'aii Gwich'in, the Native tribe historically inhabiting the
area." In 1940, the Neets'aii Gwich'in adopted a constitution under the
Indian Reorganization Act,' which established the Native Village of Ve-
netie as the governing authority of the tribe!' In 1943, the Secretary of
the Interior formed a reservation for the tribe, comprised of 1.8 million
acres of land that surrounded the village." In December 1971, ANCSA
revoked all but one Alaskan reservation and provided for corporations
47. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(b). This section provided the corporations the right to effectively "trade"
their corporate status and excess acreage for the land that comprised their original reservation. Id.
48. ANCSA provides:
All claims against the United States, the State, and all other persons that are based on
claims of aboriginal right, title, use, or occupancy of land or water areas in Alaska, or that
are based on any statute or treaty of the United States relating to Native use and occu-
pancy, or that are based on the laws of any other nation, including any such claims that
are pending before any Federal or state court or the Indian Claims Commission, are
hereby extinguished.
43 U.S.C. § 1603. Prior to ANCSA, rights of Alaska Natives to their aboriginal lands were unclear.
See Marilyn J. Ward Ford, Indian Coutry and Inherent Tribal Authority: Will They Survive
ANCSA?, 14 ALAsKA L REv. 443, 445 (1997). The Alaska Statehood Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-
508, 72 Stat. 339, amended by Alaska Omnibus Act, Pub. L. No. 86-70, 73 Stat. 141 (1959) (codi-
fied as amended at 48 U.S.C. §§ 21-488 (1994)), acknowledged that Alaska Natives had land
claims, but did not resolve them. As a result, the Alaska Natives claimed aboriginal title to almost
the entire state, filing claims with the Department of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior
"froze" the transkr of title to public land to the State until this issue of native land claims was re-
solved. See id.
49. 118 S. Ct. 948 (1998).
50. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101
F.3d 1286,1289(1996).
51. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383,48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)). See Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1289. The Indian Reorganization Act
enabled all then existing Indian tribes to organize and adopt a constitution. 25 U.S.C. § 476(a)
(1994).
52. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1289.
53. Id.
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comprised entirely of Native shareholders.' ANCSA recognized two
Native villages within the boundaries of the former Venetie Reservation
and established two Native village corporations for the Neets'aii
Gwich'in: the Venetie Indian Corporation and the Neets'aii
Corporation.' Two years later, the shareholders of the Venetie and
Neets'aii corporations exercised their right, pursuant to ANCSA, to take
fee simple title to the former Venetie reservation.' In 1979, the tribal
membership, acting through the two corporations, transferred the former
Venetie Reservation land title to Venetie.f The shareholders then voted
to dissolve the two corporations.'
In 1986, Venetie enacted a Business Activities Tax, imposing a tax
on gains derived from commercial activities within the village." Shortly
thereafter, the state of Alaska contracted with a construction company to
build a new school within the boundaries of the Venetie Village.' Vene-
tie proceeded to impose the new tax and assess it against the construction
company." Alaska, the party responsible for payment of the tax, refused
to pay and the Village brought an action for collection in tribal court.'
Rather than answer the complaint in the tribal court, the state of
Alaska filed a claim in federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against the Native Village. ' Alaska claimed that Venetie had no
jurisdiction to impose a tax on nonmembers because (a) it was not an
Indian tribe empowered to exercise tribal sovereignty and (b) it did not
exist on an Indian reservation." The district court issued an order en-
joining the tribe's enforcement proceedings and Venetie appealed.'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
preliminary injunction ruling." The appellate court concluded the tribe's
authorization to impose such a tax hinged on two factors: (1) whether it
54. Id. "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except where inconsistent with the
provisions of this [Act], the various reserves ... are hereby revoked subject to any valid existing
rights of non-Natives." 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1994).
55. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1290.
56. Id. The Unites States conveyed the former Venetie Reservation land title to the Venetie
Indian Corporation and the Neets'aii Corporation as tenants in common. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. in 1981, the state of Alaska proceeded to officially dissolve the corporations for non-
payment of incorporation fees. Id.
59. Id. The power to tax is an inherent authority in any government and is therefore an aspect
of the retained sovereignty of Indian tribes except where it has been limited or withdrawn by federal
authority. COHEN, supra note 3, at 43 1.
60. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1290.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384,
1386 (9th Cir. 1988).
64. Venetie, 856 F.2d at 1386.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1391.
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was a federally recognized tribe, and (2) whether it inhabited "Indian
country."' The case was remanded back to the district court to resolve
these issues.'
The United States District Court for the State of Alaska found the
lands of the Venetie tribe were neither set aside for Alaska Natives, nor
under the superintendence of the federal government. Therefore the Ve-
netie Indians, although a tribe, were not a dependent Indian community
for purposes of section 1151 (b).' Based on these findings, the court con-
cluded the lands of the Venetie Indians did not constitute Indian country,
rendering the tribe without authority to impose a tax upon nonmembers."
The district court opinion stated, however, that the tribe did consti-
tute a dependent Indian community prior to the enactment of ANCSA."
The court determined that ANCSA significantly diminished the federal
government's power by prohibiting the government from exercising the
level of superintendence necessary to be the dominant political institu-
tion in the area, to the exclusion of the state 2 Implicit in this opinion lies
the court's unsupported assumption that a dependent Indian community
requires total superintendence by the federal government and leaves no
jurisdictional powers to the state. The Venetie tribe appealed, arguing
that the district court applied an unduly restrictive standardn to determine
whether their land was Indian country, that ANCSA did not extinguish
Indian country in Alaska, and that the Venetie tribe continues to occupy
Indian country.' The tribe asserted that based on these three factors, they
retained the inherent authority to tax activities within their territory.5
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
district court, holding that while a dependent Indian community requires
a showing of federal set aside and federal superintendence, these re-
quirements are to be broadly construed under a multifactored test.: Ap-
67. Id. at 1390.
68. ld. at 1391.
69. State ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, No. F87-
0051,1995 WL 462232, at *20 (D. Alaska Aug. 2,1995).
70. Id. at *20.
71. Id. at*15.
72. Id. at*19.
73. The Venetie tribe argued for the application of a broad set of factors such as those set forth
in United States v. Martine, 442 F.2d 1022, 1023-24 (10th Cir. 1971), and United States v. South
Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 839-43 (8th Cir. 1981). See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text. The
district court, however, determined that the essential factors to be considered when assessing the
existence of a dependent Indian community were whether the Tribal Government holds land set
apart for the Indians and whether the Tribal Government is under the active supervision of the fed-
enl government. See Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal
Gov't, 101 F.3d 1286, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court ultimately applied this variation of
the test. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. CL 948, 953 (1998); see also
infra notes 94-113 and accompanying text.
74. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1290.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1302.
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plying the test set forth below, the court concluded that ANCSA did not
extinguish Indian country in Alaska and that the Venetie village consti-
tuted a dependent Indian community whose territory satisfied the defimi-
tional test for Indian country.'
While agreeing with the district court that federal set aside and fed-
eral superintendence are the dominant elements of the dependent Indian
community analysis, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the following factors as
a means of broadly construing those requirements:
(1) the nature of the area; (2) the relationship of the area inhabitants
to Indian tribes and the federal government; (3) the established prac-
tice of government agencies toward that area; (4) the degree of fed-
eral ownership of and control over the area; (5) the degree of cohe-
siveness of the area inhabitants; and (6) the extent to which the area
was set aside for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent In-
dian peoples.7
In formulating these factors, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on two
circuit court decisions which played a leading role in shaping the law
regarding dependent Indian communities subsequent to the enactment of
section 1151. " Each of these cases set out a multifactored analysis of its
own to determine the Indian country issue.'
1. United States v. Martine
The defendant, Martine, was a Navajo Indian charged with invol-
untary manslaughter in an auto accident which occurred on land owned
by the Navajo Tribe.'3 In deciding that the land in question was Indian
country, the trial court considered the following three factors: "[1] the
nature of the area in question, [21 the relationship of the inhabitants of
the area to Indian Tribes and to the federal government, and [3] the es-
tablished practice of government agencies toward the area." The Tenth
Circuit concluded that this was the proper approach and upheld the trial
court's decision."
2. United States v. South Dakota"
The state of South Dakota appealed a district court decision declar-
ing a housing project located in the city of Sisseton, South Dakota, to be
77. Id. at 1293.
78. Id. at 1294.
79. State ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venctie Tribal Gov't, No. F87-
0051 CV, 1995 WL 462232, at *6 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 1995).
80. Id.
81. 442F.2d 1022 (10th Cir. 1971).
82. Martine, 442 F.2d at 1022.
83. Id. at 1023.
84. Id.
85. 665 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 198 1).
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a "dependent Indian community." Relying on Martine, the Eighth Cir-
cuit in South Dakota considered four factors: (1) whether the United
States retained title to the lands and authority to enact regulations re-
specting the territory; (2) the nature of the area and the relationship of the
inhabitants of the area to Indian tribes and to the federal government and
the established practice of the government towards the area; (3) whether
there was an element of cohesiveness among the people; and (4) whether
such lands were set apart for the use and occupancy and protection of
dependent Indian peoples." The Eighth Circuit concluded that the land,
held by the United States in trust for the Sioux Tribe, was a dependent
Indian community within the meaning of section 1151 (b)."
Based on an evaluation of its six factor test drawn from Martine and
South Dakota, the Ninth Circuit in Venetie found that ANCSA did not
extinguish Indian country, and that it specifically conferred the land at
issue to the Venetie Natives, clearly satisfying the set aside requirement
for a dependent Indian community!s' In addition, the Ninth Circuit cate-
gorically disagreed with the district court's analysis of federal superin-
tendence and its notion that federal supervision must be dominant to sat-
isfy this prong of the test.' The court stated that the test of federal su-
perintendence focuses on whether the federal government has abandoned
its trust responsibilities,9 ' rather than whether the state government has
been involved in tribal affairs.' The Ninth Circuit then concluded
ANCSA did not terminate the trust relationship between the federal gov-
ernment and the Venetie tribe and therefore the federal superintendence
prong of the test was satisfied."
B. Supreme Court Decision
The unanimous opinion, written by Justice Clarence Thomas, held
the term "dependent Indian communities" refers to a limited category of
Indian lands that are neither reservations nor allotments,"' and that satisfy
two requirements-first, they must have been set aside by the federal
government for the use of the Indians as Indian land; second, they must
be under federal superintendence." The Court concluded the Venetie
86. South Dakota, 665 F.2d at 838.
87. Id. at 839.
88. Id. at 838-41.
89. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101
F.3d 1286,1296 (9th Cir. 1996).
90. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1297.
91. The trust responsibility requires the government to act in the best interests of the Indians in
every aspect of Indian life. PEvAR, supra note 36, at 26.
92. The trust responsibility may be vacated only by an express act of Congress. Id. at 30.
93. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1297.
94. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. CL 948, 951 (1998); see 18
u.S.C. § 1151(c).
95. Venetie, 118 S. CL at 953.
DENVER UNIVERSI7Y LAW REVIEW
Tribe's lands did not satisfy either of these requirements and therefore
were not Indian country."
The Court reasoned that by enacting section 1151(b), Congress
codified the federal set aside and superintendence requirements which
the Court had previously held necessary for a finding of "Indian country"
generally.' The Court referred to its previous holdings in Sandoval,"
Pelican," and McGowan," indicating Indian lands that were not reserva-
tions could still constitute Indian country, and the federal government
could therefore exercise jurisdiction over such lands.'
In all of these cases, the Court relied upon a finding of both a fed-
eral set aside and federal superintendence to conclude that the Indian
lands in question constituted Indian country. In addition, the Historical
and Revision Notes to section 1151 declare that its definition is based on
the Sandoval, Pelican, and McGowan holdings.'" With those two points
in mind, the Court chose to ignore the standards set forth by the Ninth
Circuit, drawn from Martine and South Dakota, determining that Con-
gress intended only that the federal set aside and superintendence require-
ments be satisfied prior to the finding of a dependent Indian community."w
Based on these findings, the Court concluded that as a result of
ANCSA, the Venetie Tribal lands were not validly set aside for the use
of the Indians, nor were they under the superintendence of the federal
government.'" The Court opined that ANCSA's revocation of the exist-
ing Venetie reservation, and all reservations in Alaska set aside by legis-
lation or Executive or Secretarial Order for Native use," manifested a
clear departure from Congress's traditional practice of setting aside In-
dian lands." Rejecting the Tribe's argument that the ANCSA lands were
specifically set aside, the Court cited the portion of ANCSA stating that
lands are transferred "without any restraints on alienation or significant
use restrictions, and with the goal of avoiding 'any permanent racially
defined institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations."'" The Court con-
96. ld. at 955.
97. Id. at 953.
98. 231 U.S. 28,46 (1913).
99. 232 U.S. 442,449 (1914).
100. 302 U.S. 535, 537 (1938).
101. Venetie, 118 S. CL at 953.
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 note (1994) (Historical and Revision Notes--1948 Act) (explaining
that subsection (a) regarding reservation lands is a codification of Donnelly, subsection (b) is a
codification of the "dependent Indian community" concept as developed in McGowan and &mdoval,
and subsection (c) is the codification of the holding of Pelican regarding allotments).
103. Venetie, 118 S. Ct. at 954.
104. Id. at 955.
105. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (1994). The Alaskan Annette Island Reservation was expressly ex-
empted from revocation by ANCSA. Id.
106. Venetie, 118 S. CL at 955.
107. Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (1994)).
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cluded that because Congress contemplated that non-Natives could own
the former Venetie Reservation, and because the Tribe was free to use it
for non-Indian purposes,"~ the federal set-aside requirement was not met."r
The Court also concluded that ANCSA ended federal superinten-
dence over the Tribe's lands."" Citing Congress's intention that
ANCSA's settlement provisions work to avoid a "lengthy wardship or
trusteeship,""' the Court decided that any remaining federal protection of
the Tribe's land is quite limited and does not approach the level of su-
perintendence necessary to meet the requirement as intended by Con-
gress."2 Conceding that ANCSA's attempt to instill self-determination
undercuts the federal superintendence requirement, the Court stated that




Hopefully Congress will heed the Court's call, as it did when its
first "Indian country" definition was misinterpreted in 1873."' Through-
out history, both Congress and the executive branch have been inconsis-
tent in their maintenance of the federal government's unique relationship
with, and responsibility to, Indian tribes and to the Indian people as a
whole. While ANCSA supports Native autonomy and disavows any
lengthy wardship and trusteeship, an understanding of the origin of the
unique relationship between the Native Americans and the federal gov-
ernment reconciles the seemingly contradictory status the Venetie Indi-
ans seek.
The Supreme Court began to recognize the existence of a trust rela-
tionship between the federal government and Indian people in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia,"' and Worcester v. Georgia,"" two decisions inter-
preting Indian treaties. Between 1787 and 1871 the government entered
into hundreds of treaties with Indian tribes in which the Indians gave up
108. The tribe used the land exclusively for Indian purposes. Under the original statute,
ANCSA restricted membership in its corporations exclusively to Natives for 20 years. 43 U.S.C. §
1606(h)(1) (1982) as amended by Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act Amendments of 1987, Pub.
L. No. 100-241, 101 Stat. 1788 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1629c (1994)). However, the 1987 Amend-
ments allow each corporation to extend this restriction indefinitely. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c)(!)(B)(i).
109. Venetie, 118 S. CL. at 955.
110. Id.
Ill. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b).
112. Venetie, 118 S.Ct. at956.
113. Id.
114. Congress revised the definition of "Indian country" to expressly encompass Alaska after
the court held otherwise in Seve/off. United States v. Seveloff, 27 F. Cas. 1021, 1024 (D. Or. 1872).
The Indian Intercourse Act of 1834, along with the subsequent revision in 1873, incorporated the
revised definition. Act of Mar. 3. 1873, ch. 227, 17 Stat. 510, 530 (1873); see supra Part LA (dis-
cussing the early development of "Indian country").
115. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1(1831).
116. 31 U.S. (6Pet.)515(1832).
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their land in return for promises made by the government."7 The Supreme
Court has held such promises, including guarantees that the United States
would create permanent reservations and protect the safety and well-
being of tribal members, create a trust relationship resembling that of a
ward to his guardian."' This "trust responsibility imposes an independent
obligation upon the federal government to remain loyal to the Indians
and to advance their interests.""' 9 A trust relationship, however, may be
terminated without a tribe's consent by an express act of Congress.'"
In 1970, President Nixon enunciated a federal policy of self-
determination toward the Native Americans without termination of the
trust relationship. 2 ' The President denounced terminating the trust rela-
tionship because it would ignore the moral and legal obligations between
the Native American tribes and the federal government.In In the abstract,
President Nixon's statements indicate some historical support for the
argument that the federal government is not abandoning its trust relation-
ship when it supports and advocates Indian self-determination. '" Rather
the government is working to fulfill these trust responsibilities.' There-
fore, ANCSA, a statute enacted only one year later, should be construed
with this policy in mind. ANCSA provided the Venetie tribe with meth-
ods of enhancing its self determination while maintaining the federal
government's trust responsibilities toward the Venetie Indians.
A. Meeting the Requirements for a Dependent Indian Community
1. Federal Set Aside
The Supreme Court, in Venetie, determined the Venetie tribal lands
did not meet the federal set aside requirement for two reasons. First,
117. PEVAR, supra note 36 at 26. From the onset of colonization until the War of 1812, the
United States and the Indian tribes negotiated treaties as relative equals. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 548-
49. The end of the war also brought an end to the threat of British intervention in United States
affairs and friendship with the Indians became less valuable. As a result, post-war Indian treaties
were usually coerced. For example, in 1835, President Andrew Jackson forced the Cherokees to sign
the Treaty ofNew Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478, in which the Cherokees gave up their land east
of the Mississippi River in exchange for five million dollars. COHEN, supra note 3, at 84. After the
signing the treaty, the government compelled the Cherokees to march to Oklahoma, on what came to
be known as the "Trail of Tears." COHEN, supra note 3, at 92. In 1871, Congress enacted a law
prohibiting the making of treaties with Indians, declaring that Indians were not sovereign nations
with whom the United States could make treaties. 25 U.S.C. § 71. For a comprehensive discussion of
Indian treaties, see COHEN, supra note 3, at 62-105.
118. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16.
119. PEvAR, supra note 36, at 27.
120. Id. at 30.
121. COHEN, supra note 3, at 185-86 (citing Special Message to the Congress on Indian Af-
fairs, 1970 PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8, 1970)).
122. Id. at 186.
123. Id.
124. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101
F.3d 1286, 1298 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Congress contemplated that non-Natives could own the former Venetie
Reservation and second, the Tribe was free to use the land for non-Indian
purposes.'" In reaching this conclusion the Court dismissed the Tribe's
contention that lands acquired pursuant to a specific ANCSA provision
were set aside for the use of the Tribe. This provision allowed Natives to
take title to former reservation lands in return for forgoing all other
ANCSA transfers.'" The Congressional Record for ANCSA states:
Under the committee bill all reservations in Alaska are revoked, un-
less the village corporations located within the reservation elect to
take fee title to the reservation. If Natives do elect to take title to the
reservation, they will not participate in the land selection procedures
of the bill, nor share in the monetary settlement.'
It is evident from the language of the record that the legislature in-
tended that village corporations electing to take fee title would retain res-
ervation status. While this legislative commentary should clearly indicate
an intent to "set aside" land for the Native tribes who wish to maintain
their current tribal land status, the Court disregarded the legislative history.
In addition, the corporations established under ANCSA are different
from ordinary business corporations in that only Natives may own stock
in the ANCSA corporations. Under the statute, membership in the corpo-
rations was originally restricted to Natives for twenty years; ' however,
this membership may now be extended indefinitely." The Act also pro-
vides for each village corporation to be comprised of Natives from a par-
ticular village," and each village corporation gained estate to the land on
which it was already situated."3 ' It is impossible to ignore the connection
between the Native tribal lands and the method by which they were con-
veyed under ANCSA, yet this significance was overlooked by the Su-
preme Court. Congress specifically conferred the land at issue to the
Venetie Tribe by statute, and this clearly satisfies the federal set aside
requirement.
2. Federal Superintendence
Although the concept of "Indian country" rings of independence,
the statutory definition requires the existence of a dependent Indian
125. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948,955 (1998).
126. Brief for Respondent at 40-41, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, I I8 S.
CL 948 (1998) (No. 96-1577) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1618(b) (1994), in support of their contention that
the lands had been set aside specifically for Indian use).
127. Id. at 42-43 (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 46,967 (1971)).
128. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(h)(1) (1982).
129. 43 U.S.C. § 1629c(c)(!)(B)(i) (1994).
130. 43 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (1994).
131. 43 U.S.C. § 1611 (a)(l) (1994) (conferring on each corporation the right to select all of the
township in which any part of the village is located, plus an area that will make the selection equal to
the acreage to which the village is entitled).
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community.'32 This dependency standard requires federal superinten-
dence; as a result, the ability of the Indians to maintain their tribal sover-
eignty remains conditioned on the requirement of federal superinten-
dence. Is it possible for the Indians to truly maintain sovereignty under
such circumstances?
The concept of sovereignty with superintendence originated in the
Supreme Court opinion of Johnson v. M'Intosh.' The Court held that the
United States acquired title to all of the land in North America by dis-
covery and conquest and, in turn, the Indians necessarily lost title to their
land."M Although the Indians lost title, they retained a "possessory inter-
est" in all their land unless and until Congress takes that interest away." '
With this in mind, even land that is "Indian country" does not truly be-
long to the Indians. It belongs to the United States government and must
remain under the superintendence of the government.
The Supreme Court concluded that in order to meet the federal su-
perintendence requirement, the federal government must actively control
the lands in question, effectively acting as a guardian for the Indians."
The Court concluded that after ANCSA, the federal protection of the
Tribe's land' did not approach the level of superintendence over the
Indians' land that existed in prior cases." This conclusion is problematic
because it assumes the requisite federal superintendence must be over
land. The Supreme Court, however, clarified this issue by expressly
stating in United States v. John"9 that the "Indians" must be under federal
supervision, not the land."
The federal government has maintained a course of protective deal-
ings with the Venetie Tribe over the past 130 years."' The Department of
132. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994).
133. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
134. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat). at 592.
135. Id. A possessory interest recognizes aboriginal title but no ownership right in the land. The
land cannot be sold nor is a tribe entitled to compensation when the government "takes" their pos-
sessory interest. Id. Although the Indians retain no ownership interest in their land, they retain a right
of occupancy of their ancestral lands. Id. at 574.
136. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tnrbal Gov't, 118 S. Ct 948,956 (1998).
137. The Court stated that federal protection was "limited to a statutory declaration that the land
is exempt from adverse possession claims, real property taxes, and certain judgments as long as it
has not been sold, leased, or developed." Venetie, 118 S. Ct. at 956.
138. Id.
139. 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
140. John, 437 U.S. at 649.
141. Since the purchase of the Alaska Territory in 1967, Alaska Native tribes have been under
the same legal regime that applies to all other Native American tribes. See Brief for Respondent at 8,
Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct. 948 (1997) (No. 96-1577). The 1867
Treaty of Cession, subjected the tribes to "such laws and regulations as the United States may, from
time to time adopt." Treaty of Cession, Mar. 30, 1867, U.S.-Russ., 15 Stat 539, 542. As a conse-
quence, courts early on upheld the obligation of the federal government to protect the Natives in-
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the Interior continually issued guardianship and protection to the Venetie
Tribe, ultimately setting aside a reservation for their protection and bene-
fit in 1943."2 Since then the government has consistently exercised its
trust responsibility to the Venetie Tribe by providing government serv-
ices and programs, such as allocating federal Indian Health Service
monies,'" money for housing and development projects, and grants for
self-governance projects.'"
The federal government's superintendence role over the Venetie
Tribe was not weakened, rather it was preserved by the enactment of
ANCSA.'" ANCSA's measures concerning stock and alienability, voting
rights and land protection" reflect Congress's intent to maintain that
role. ANCSA's provisions preserving the federal government's trust re-
sponsibility to provide desperately needed health, social, welfare and eco-
nomic programs for the Tribe and imposing extensive controls over the
activities of the corporations prior to their dissolution" underscore the
federal government's continuing superintendence over Venetie as well.
In addition, there is no support for the Supreme Court's conclusion
that the superintendence of the federal government must be dominant.'"
State supervision over some aspects of Indian life "does not eviscerate
Indian country."'" Despite Congress's delegation of partial jurisdiction to
the states over some areas inhabited by Indians, such areas remain Indian
country. 5
Finally, since the enactment of ANCSA, Congress does not exclude
Alaska Natives from any programs available to other Native Americans,
and has specifically included them among those eligible for programs
under all new major Indian legislation."" Such recognition further evi-
dences the federal government's intent to maintain its trust relationship
cluding the ejection of non-Natives encroaching on aboriginal lands. See Respondent's Brief at 8,
Venede (No. 96-1577).
142. See Respondent's Brief at 27, Venetie (No. 96-1577).
143. For example, Venetie's allocation of federal Indian Health Service capital for 1992 totaled
$445,000. See id. at 28 n.24.
144. Id.
145. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(c) (1994). This section provides that " no provision of the chapter
shall... relieve, replace or diminish any obligation of the United States or of the State of Alaska to
protect and promote the rights or welfare of Natives." Id.
146. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606-1607,1611 (1994). These sections require stock, voting rights and land
to be held by Natives. Id.
147. Id.
148. Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. CL 948,956 (1998).
149. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101
F.3d 1286, 1297 (1996).
150. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994) (granting certain states extensive criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country).
151. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) (1994);
Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1603(c), (d) (1994); Tribally-Controlled Commu-
nity College Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1801(2) (1994); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §
1903(3), (8) (1994).
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with the Natives, thus satisfying the federal superintendence requirement
for a dependent Indian community.
B. Assimilation
Alternatively, there is a glaring likelihood that Congress intended all
along for ANCSA to have a disabling effect on Indian country and tribal
sovereignty. The government arguably often has developed innovative
ways to take land and rights from the Indians. While treaties were exe-
cuted throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many
were entered into by force or fraud." Similarly, twentieth-century U.S.
statutory law has often revealed itself as a wolf in sheep's clothing.-'
ANCSA was touted by its creators as pro-Indian legislation,'" yet ap-
pears to have had the opposite effect on the Venetie tribe. Over the years,
the government and the Indians have notoriously had different views on
what is best for the Indians. ANCSA is another example of Congress's
attempt to assimilate a group of people many of whom may not want to
be assimilated into non-Indian society."
C. Canons of Construction
Because congressional pronouncements in the area of Indian law
have traditionally been broad and often contradictory," a number of Su-
preme Court decisions have announced fundamental canons for constru-
ing these acts!" Paramount to any analysis is the principle that the intent
of Congress to extinguish Indian country must be reflected by language
that is clear and plain." As a result, any Indian right that is not expressly
extinguished by a treaty or federal statute is reserved to Indian tribes.'" In
152. See Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation, Reparations and Restitution: Indian Property
Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L REV. 453,459 (1994) (comparing the fraud and coercion used
in Indian treaty execution with modem statutory law); see also supra note 117 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Indian Removal Act of 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (authorizing the President to
negotiate with tribes for their removal from the east); The General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887,
ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 US.C. §§ 331-358 (1994)) (providing parcels of land
to individual Indians in an attempt to break up tribes and assimilate the Indians into white culture).
154. See Kathryn A. Black, et. aL, When World's Collide: Alaska Native Corporations and the
Bankruptcy Code, 6 ALASKA L. REv. 73, 77-78 (1989); Donald Craig Mitchell, Alaska v. Native
Village of Venetie: Statutory Construction or Judicial Usurpation? Why History Counts, 14
ALASKA L. REv. 353,440 (1997).
155. Beginning with the General Allotment Act of 1887, many Indians have been reluctant to
accept the govermunt's attempts to assimilate the Indians into white culture. This is evidenced by the
numenrous tribes who ate maintaining their tribal culture into the twenty-first century. See supra note 39.
156. See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning and the Dynamic Nature
of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL L REV. 1137, 1138 (1990) (discussing the congressional inconsis-
tencies with respect to Indian law).
157. Id. at 1141.
158. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339,354 (1941).
159. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,323 (1978).
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addition, any ambiguities in statutes and treaties are to be interpreted in
favor of Indian tribes."
There is no clear language in the ANCSA legislation of Congress's
intent to extinguish Indian country. Since such clear and plain language
is required, if Congress had intended ANCSA to extinguish Indian coun-
try in Alaska it would have expressly done so. Absent such language,
Alaska Natives must retain their inherent tribal rights and governmental
autonomy.
While there is no express language in ANCSA extinguishing Indian
country, there is express language regarding the obligations of both the
federal government and the state of Alaska.' ANCSA explicitly did not
"relieve, replace or diminish any obligation of the United States or of the
state of Alaska to protect and promote the rights or welfare of Natives."'"
Therefore, ANCSA contains a provision specifically pointed toward
maintaining the federal protection of Native rights, one of which is the
right of the Natives to retain their tribal lands.
In general, courts can either rely on canons of construction to de-
termine cases or reject them by claiming that legislative intent is unam-
biguous.'" However, the Court in this case did not even mention these
canons;' instead the Court ignored its own precedent in this decision."
If ANCSA is unambiguous, it must contain clear and plain language ex-
pressing intent to extinguish Indian country, and it contains no such lan-
guage. Alternatively, if ANCSA is ambiguous, it should be interpreted in
favor of the Venetie tribe. Such an interpretation would have the Venetie
tribe enjoying their sovereign powers through the implementation of
their Business Activities Tax, within Indian country. Either way, it is
evident that in light of these canons of construction the Venetie Tribal
land should maintain its Indian country status.
160. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,247-48 (1985) (stating
that the canons of construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in the trust relationship between
the United States and the Indians and that it is well established that treaties should be construed
liberally in favor of the Indians).
161. See43 U.S.C. § 1601(c) (1994).
162. Id.
163. DeCoteau v. District County Cowl, 420 U.S. 425,447 (1975).
164. See State ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, No.
F87-0051 CV, 1995 WL 462232 (D. Alaska Aug. 2, 1995); see also Mizner, supra note 45. Mizner
contends that these canons do not apply to ANCSA, observing that most of the major recent Su-
preme Court cases involving statutory analysis of Indian law can only be read consistently if the
canon is interpreted to apply only when congress acted in its role as tribal trustee. Id. at 864. This is
because the canon arises from the trust relationship as embodied in the conception that the federal
government holds lands on behalf of the tribes and must manage these lands for the tribe's benefit.
Id. Mizner compares the Court's application of the canons in County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992), and Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe,
471 U.S. 759 (1985), with its application in Andrus v. Glover Construction Co., 446 US. 608 (1980).
Id. at 865-67.
165. See Oneida, 470 U.S. at 247-48; United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978);
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 447; United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339,354 (1941).
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D. Implications of the Decision
The Supreme Court's holding in Venetie was persuaded in part by
perceived, yet unfounded, implications of a finding of Indian country.'6
M
Fear that such a ruling would potentially and seriously disrupt the en-
forcement of state law throughout Alaska plagued the decision."' The
possibility that the state of Alaska would be required to compete with
potentially hundreds of independent entities for governmental authority
within the State also loomed large." More specifically, the Court was
concerned that Native tribes across the United States would begin exces-
sive taxation of non-tribal members based on the Tribes' status as de-
pendent Indian communities. In reality, the warnings and predictions of
legal and cultural chaos expressed by the state of Alaska and other states
were misleading and highly exaggerated."
In fact, contrary to the argument of the state of Alaska, the Ninth
Circuit Venetie decision was very narrow." It did not hold, or even im-
ply, that Indian country existed in all Native Villages in Alaska."' Nor
did it hold that all ANCSA village corporation lands are Indian country
and subject to tribal jurisdiction.'" The Ninth Circuit established a six-
prong test" to be satisfied in order for a community to constitute Indian
country."' The court's decision emphasized that all six elements must be
satisfied by any Native community in Alaska seeking to show that it oc-
cupies Indian country.'" The Venetie satisfied the sixth prong"6 by dem-
onstrating that the land in question was created pursuant to ANCSA."
166. The possibility of a decision in favor of Indian country raised fears of unlimited tribal
authority which would requie the state to compete with tribes for governmental authority within
Alaska. See Joseph D. Matal, A Revisionist History of Indian Country, 14 ALASKA L REv. 283, 348
(1997).
167. See generaUy it (arguing that section IStI was meant to define only the scope of federal
laws that apply to Indian country and contending that there is no Indian country in post-ANCSA
Alaska).
168. Id. at 348 (discussing the potential of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Venerie ruling to
disrupt the enforcement of state law throughout Alaska).
169. Ward Fon, supra note 48, at 467-68 (refuting the concerns of the petitioner and amici
curiae that the Venetie decision could enlarge the scope of tribal authority and threaten the state's
ability to enforce state laws).
170. ld. at 468.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra text accompanying note 78.
174. Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 101
F.3d 1286, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 118 S. Ct.
948(1998).
175. Venetie, 101 F.3d at 1300-02.
176. The sixth prong is "the extent to which the area was set aside for the use, occupancy, and
protection of dependent Indian peoples." Id. at 1292.
177. Id. at 1301-02. A close reading of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Venetie indicates that it
only discusses the status of Native Village lands. It is questionable whether the six-prong test is also
applicable to regional corporation lands that form a part of a Native community in Alaska. See id at
1302.
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Although the Venetie tribe also satisfied the other five prongs of the test,
there is no basis for the belief that every Indian community would satisfy
all six prongs. Thus, there is no credible evidence to support arguments
about the ominous impact of the Venetie decision and assertions of legal
chaos.
1. The Venetie View
On May 6, 1998, the Alaska Inter-Tribal Council and the Rural
Alaska Community Action Program organized a rally and subsequent
conference in response to the Venetie decision three months before.'
Tribal leaders organized the conference in order to develop a plan to re-
invigorate and expand tribal authority in Alaska." Over 3,000 Alaska
Natives marched through the streets of Anchorage in protest of the gov-
ernmental assault on Native rights." Some speakers at the rally criticized
the current legislature, urging Natives to register to vote and remove
hostile legislators from office,"'
While the rally showed a general feeling of unrest among Alaska
Natives, many do not expect much to change in the wake of the Venetie
decision. Some tribal members defiantly contend that they still have their
land and sovereignty regardless of the interpretation of the Supreme
Court." Alaska tribes seem to be turning their attention to defining their
authority over internal tribal matters" in an attempt to at least maintain
sovereignty over their own people. Undoubtedly, Alaska Natives will be
taking their cause to Congress in an attempt to realize and emphasize
their sovereign rights,"' and lawyers predict the necessity of further law-
suits to clarify the limits of these sovereign powers. '"
The Venetie decision seems to be seen by the Alaska Natives as a
minor set back. They have not lost their continuing battle to maintain
their rights, because they will absolutely not give up what is rightfully
theirs; their land, their sovereignty, their way of life.
178. Don Hunter, In the Wake of Venetie Tribes Gather to Regroup, Re-Energize, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, May 6, 1998, at Al.
179. Id.
180. Tom Kizzia, et al., 4,000 Rally for Rights of Natives, March Sets Downtown to Ringing,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, May 8, 1998, at Al.
181. Id.
182. Tim Bristol, Supreme Court Rejects Alaska Tribe's Indian Country Claim, NATIVE
AMERICAS, Mar. 31, 1998,available in 1998WL 1803950
183. Tom Kizzia, Town Sites Keep Alive Native Hopes, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 22,
1998. at BI.
184. T'ina Kelley, Courts vs. Native Alaskans: The "Last Indian War," CHRISTIAN S.
MONITOR, Mar. 13, 1998, at 14.
185. Liz Ruskin, Venetie Is Only the Start, Self-Governance Is Still Main Goal, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS. Feb 27, 1998, at Al.
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2. One Outsider's View
The implications of the Supreme Court's decision on the Venetie
Indian tribe and Native Americans as a whole are potentially devastating.
The reverence the Native Americans hold for the sovereignty of their
tribal governments is tremendous.'" This sovereignty has been taken
away from the Venetie tribe.
American Indian tribes and tribal governments existed long before
the framers of the Constitution." They have ruled themselves and their
land for hundreds of years.'" After hundreds of years of swinging back
and forth in the realm of Indian rights,' the pendulum once again swings
toward oppression with the ultimate goal of assimilation. The United
States has attempted to steal the land, leadership and way of life from the
Native Americans.
IV. CONCLUSION
A dependent Indian community exists when land has been set aside
by the federal government and is under federal superintendence."0
Through ANCSA, Congress specifically set aside land for the Venetie
186. Ward Ford, supra note 48, at 468-69.
187. See supra note I and accompanying text.
188. North America was inhabited by over four hundred independent Indian nations when it
was "discovered" by Columbus in 1492. PEVAR, supra note 36, at 2. Each nation had its own lan-
guage, government and culture, and controlled its own territory. Id.
189. Since the "discovery" of the Americas in the late-fifteenth century, our forefather's treat-
ment of the Indians has fluctuated depending on the political mood of the day. PEVAR, supra note
36, at 2-9. From 1492 to 1787, treaties and agreements were made amicably between the settlers and
tribes. Id. at 2-3. Following the Revolutionary War, Congress began enacting laws which affected
the Indians, such as forbidding settlers from forcibly taking Indian land. Id. at 3-4. It was not long
before the government began overlooking such laws however, and eventually federal Indian policy
changed to the Indian's detriment. Id. In 1828, Andrew Jackson became President and Congress
passed the Indian Removal Act, which forced the Indians westward. Id. at 4. From the latter half of
the nineteenth century, into the early twentieth century the Indians were forced to assimilate into
white society through the passage of the General Allotment Act. Id. at 5. In the 1930's, federal
Indian policy changed for the better when Franklin D. Roosevelt took office as President and Con-
gress passed the Indian Reorganization Act. Id. at 6. Among other provisions, this Act prohibited
further allotment of tribal land to individual Indians and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
add land to existing reservations and create new reservations for landless tribes. Id. Between 1935
and 1953 Indian landholdings increased by over two million acres and federal funds were allocated
to programs intended to enhance the Indians' quality of life. Id. at 7. The economic well-being of the
Indians began to decline again during the 1950's when Congress abandoned the goals of the Indian
Reorganization Act and adopted a policy of "termination," terminating federal benefits and support
services and forcing dissolution of a number of Indian reservations. Id. In 1968, Indian policy began
another upward swing with Congress repudiating the termination policies of the 1950s thereby
promoting tribal self government. Id. at 8-9.
190. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
511 (1991) (holding that the question of whether land comprises Indian country depends on whether
the area was validly set apart for the use of Indians, under the superintendence of the government);
United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938).
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tribe, in the form of a corporation." ' Pursuant to ANCSA, the tribe chose
to convert their corporation back to tribal land and maintain their status
as a dependent Indian community. The federal government continued to
provide financial assistance and health programs, thus meeting the fed-
eral superintendence requirement necessary for the legal existence of a
dependent Indian community.
The designation of an area as Indian country is extremely important
to Native Americans. It allows them to maintain their inherent sover-
eignty, including the rights of self-government and self-determination. In
Indian country, for example, a tribal government has the power to enact
and impose taxes; to adopt and enforce internal tribal laws; to issue mar-
riage licenses; regulate land use; adjudicate disputes and minor criminal
offenses; and regulate affairs of non-Natives on tribal land.'9 Through its
decision in Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Governmen" the
Supreme Court moved toward divesting the entire Native American
community of its inherent right of sovereignty. The Court's decision was
misguided in its process and is unjust in its effect.
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